

# AI and Political Campaigns in the Indonesian Presidential Election 2024

R. Yogie Prawira<sup>1\*</sup>, Asy'ari<sup>2</sup>, Akhmad Roqi Alawi<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1,3</sup>Universitas Tidar, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup>UIN Syekh Wasil Kediri, Indonesia

Email\*: [yogieprawira@untidar.ac.id](mailto:yogieprawira@untidar.ac.id)

Received: 20 May 2026

Revised: 27 May 2026

Accepted: 27 June 2026

## Abstract

This study examines the deployment of generative AI (GenAI) during Indonesia's 2024 presidential election campaign, in a context where there was no specific regulation governing the use of AI in electoral campaigns. Using digital ethnography, including in-depth interviews with social media users and political supporters with different sociodemographic profiles, as well as a systematic analysis of GenAI campaign materials on platforms such as X, TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube, the study examines how the three presidential candidate pairs adopted different approaches to GenAI. AMIN rejected its use as a deliberate political stance, Ganjar-Mahfud used text-based AI (chatbots), and Prabowo-Gibran used image-based AI for visual branding. Public responses differed markedly depending on whether the GenAI content was text-based, image-based or deepfake, with the emergence of the #TolakGambarAI movement illustrating that rejecting AI imagery itself constitutes a form of digital political participation. These findings provide empirical evidence from the Global South to the growing body of scholarship on AI, political communication and digital democracy. They also highlight the urgent need for digital literacy frameworks and regulatory mechanisms to govern the use of AI in electoral contexts.


**Keywords:** Digital democracy; Generative AI; Identity construction; Political campaign; Presidential election

## Publisher's Note:

Yayasan Darussalam Bengkulu stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.




Copyright



2026 by the author(s).

License Yayasan Darussalam, Bengkulu, Indonesia.

This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0) license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>).



## INTRODUCTION

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to change the infrastructure and rhythm of daily life, including politics. The emergence of AI has significantly altered political landscapes and processes, presenting an inseparable duality of positive and negative consequences for democratic processes. AI can be used in elections and politics for election administration, organisational management and mobilisation, message development and distribution, and data analytics and research for voter behaviour (WR Numero Research 2025). It can facilitate citizen engagement through chatbots and automated response systems, maintain voter lists, determine polling station locations, authenticate voters, and monitor elections via video (P et al., 2023). ). Conversely, AI threatens electoral process integrity by producing misinformation and disinformation that manipulate public opinion and perception (Bahri et al., 2024; Jungherr et al., 2024), leading to polarisation (Messer, 2025) along with privacy, security, and trust issues (Zhao et al., 2021)

As Coeckelbergh has argued that AI is inherently political in nature a claim made visible in the Indonesian context through the ways GenAI tools were selectively deployed by campaign teams, differentially received by voters, and contested by artists and civil society as stated in (Ulinicane & Erkkilä, 2023). The development and use of AI poses various challenges to the body politic (Tinnirello, 2022), including to electoral information ecosystems, such as political campaigns. AI is increasingly being used in the electoral process to analyse large amounts of data, predict voter behaviour and tailor campaign messages, as was the case in the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit referendum (Kane, 2019). While this has the potential to increase voter engagement, it also raises concerns.

AI-powered chatbots and virtual assistants are used to interact with constituents, answer questions and gather feedback. As Roemmele and Gibson (2020) have noted, political campaigns are rapid, widespread communications aimed at conveying political messages to voters. AI has become a powerful tool for facilitating political campaigns because its communication mechanisms allow communicative actions to be developed quickly and effectively at very low cost.

McLeod (1999) views political campaigns as political rituals that provide a platform for expression, constructing a symbolic world of persuasive propaganda in the process of achieving and legitimising power. Political campaigns have become a means of presenting new values and symbolic elements. It is believed that using symbols to define and trigger emotions has a direct political effect on society by transmitting and reinforcing a positive candidate image (Kimberley, 2004). Ford (2008) adds that candidates aim to create a 'brand' an appealing public identity that gives voters an immediate understanding of the candidate and makes other candidates seem less appealing.

In this context, generative AI has become an important technology for campaign communication, substantially transforming political campaign strategies. Generative AI is an algorithm that produces content based on available data (Inie et al., 2023). In the context of campaign art, generative AI learns patterns from historical campaign materials, candidate images and slogans, and then produces attractive visuals, posters and banners. The meaningful personalisation of images and visuals produced by generative AI has enabled political candidates and groups to engage voters in innovative ways.

The 2024 Indonesian presidential elections saw the use of generative AI in campaign artwork. The easy accessibility of images and videos, and the increased online visibility that generative AI provides, has led to the development of AI tools that help political campaigns win in



election cycles (Kane, 2019). However, the development of AI is not without its risks, as political actors may not comply with norms or limit themselves to codes of ethics. Digital media is an essential means of political campaigning and has become an important environment for promoting democratic issues.

This article's main contribution is to expand the limited research on AI in politics with regard to democratic culture by adding empirical knowledge. The paper proceeds as follows. First, it provides an overview of Indonesia's political landscape and the background to the 2024 presidential election. It then identifies instances of generative AI use during the election campaign, as evidenced by digital materials. The subsequent section discusses how generative AI is employed as part of a branding strategy to create a distinct identity for each Indonesian presidential candidate and considers the implications for digital democracy in Indonesia.

This article addresses a gap in the existing literature: while studies on AI in Western electoral contexts are growing, empirical research on GenAI use in Southeast Asian democracies—particularly regarding identity construction and public response—remains limited. The study is guided by two analytical questions: (1) How did presidential candidates in the 2024 Indonesian election employ generative AI tools in their campaigns? and (2) How did the public respond to these AI-enabled campaign practices, and what implications do these responses hold for digital democracy? The paper proceeds as follows. First, it provides an overview of Indonesia's political landscape and the background to the 2024 presidential election. It then identifies instances of generative AI use during the election campaign, as evidenced by digital materials. The subsequent section discusses how generative AI is employed as part of a branding strategy to create a distinct identity for each Indonesian presidential candidate and considers the implications for digital democracy in Indonesia.

## METHODS

This study employed a digital ethnography approach to investigate the use of generative AI in the 2024 Indonesian presidential election campaigns. Digital ethnography, as a research methodology, enables the natural exploration of social phenomena through immersion in social media platforms and online communities (Grigoryan, 2024) (Moncallo, 2021). Following Hine (2000) assertion that human life practices are interconnected between offline and online sites, this research integrates both dimensions

### *Research Design*

The study adopted a qualitative research design underpinned by digital ethnography. Qualitative research is appropriate for exploring complex social phenomena that require contextual understanding and cannot be adequately captured through numerical measurement (Moleong, 2010). Digital ethnography specifically allows researchers to observe and participate in online communities and social media environments to understand how digital practices shape social life (Grigoryan, 2024).

### *Data Collection*

The study adopted a qualitative research design underpinned by digital ethnography. Rather than quantifying social phenomena, this approach enabled contextual understanding of how digital practices shape social life through researcher immersion in online communities and social media environments (Grigoryan, 2024).



<b>Informant</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age Group</b>	<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>Education</b>	<b>Social Class</b>	<b>Political Affiliation</b>
I-1	Male	18–24	Javanese	Undergraduate	Lower-middle	AMIN supporter
I-2	Female	18–24	Sundanese	Undergraduate	Middle	Ganjar-Mahfud supporter
I-3	Male	25–34	Javanese	Postgraduate	Middle	Prabowo-Gibran supporter
I-4	Female	25–34	Madurese	Undergraduate	Lower-middle	AMIN supporter
I-5	Male	35–44	Javanese	Postgraduate	Upper-middle	Non-partisan
I-6	Female	35–44	Minangkabau	Senior high school	Lower-middle	Ganjar-Mahfud supporter
I-7	Male	45–54	Javanese	Undergraduate	Middle	Prabowo-Gibran supporter
I-8	Female	45–54	Betawi	Postgraduate	Upper-middle	Non-partisan
I-9	Male	18–24	Batak	Undergraduate	Middle	AMIN supporter
I-10	Female	18–24	Javanese	Senior high school	Lower-middle	Prabowo-Gibran supporter
I-11	Male	25–34	Sundanese	Undergraduate	Middle	Non-partisan
I-12	Female	25–34	Javanese	Postgraduate	Upper-middle	Ganjar-Mahfud supporter
I-13	Male	35–44	Bugis	Undergraduate	Middle	Prabowo-Gibran supporter
I-14	Female	35–44	Javanese	Senior high school	Lower-middle	AMIN supporter
I-15	Male	45–54	Madurese	Undergraduate	Lower-middle	Ganjar-Mahfud supporter
I-16	Female	55+	Javanese	Senior high school	Lower-middle	Non-partisan
I-17	Male	18–24	Chinese-Indonesian	Postgraduate	Upper-middle	Non-partisan
I-18	Female	25–34	Javanese	Undergraduate	Middle	Prabowo-Gibran supporter

**Table 1. Informant Profile Overview**

*Note: Profile data based on self-reporting during interviews. Names anonymised.*

The content analysis corpus comprised 124 items of GenAI campaign material. Table 2 presents the corpus overview.



Candidate Pair	Platform	Format	Content Type	Period	Source Type
AMIN	X	Image	Human-illustrated campaign posts	Nov 2023–Feb 2024	Volunteer/official
AMIN	Instagram	Image	Human-illustrated posters	Nov 2023–Feb 2024	Official
Ganjar-Mahfud	X/TikTok	Chatbot/video	Ganjar AI chatbot interactions, AI-generated video	Dec 2023–Feb 2024	Official
Ganjar-Mahfud	X	Image	Human-illustrated campaign posts	Jan–Feb 2024	Volunteer
Prabowo-Gibran	X/TikTok/Instagram	Image/video	<i>Gemoy</i> anime character, AI selfie (Fotober2.AI), AR filters	Dec 2023–Feb 2024	Official/volunteer
Prabowo-Gibran	X	Image	PRABOWOGIBRAN. AI campaign content	Nov 2023–Feb 2024	Official
Multiple/public	X	Text/image	#TolakGambarAI posts, deepfake examples	Jan–Feb 2024	User-generated

**Table 2. Corpus of Analysed GenAI Campaign Materials**

*Note: Materials collected via archival observation of publicly accessible social media accounts. Selection prioritised posts with high engagement (>500 interactions) and representativeness across content types.*

### **Data Analysis**

Data were analyzed using thematic analysis informed by relevant theoretical frameworks, including political branding theory Ford (2008), connective action theory (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012b; Mirbabaie et al., 2021; Prawira et al., 2024a), and Castells' concept of project identity (Deaux, 1993; Widjaja et al., 2021). To enhance reflexivity, the researcher maintained a reflexive journal throughout the fieldwork period, documenting personal positionality as a researcher from Indonesia observing a politically charged event. Emerging interpretations were regularly discussed with co-researchers to identify potential biases, particularly regarding the treatment of content associated with politically sensitive issues such as human rights allegations and electoral fraud claims.

### **Validity of Findings**

The validity of the research is ensured through multiple triangulation strategies. Source triangulation draws on three data types: in-depth interviews with 15 informants of diverse



sociodemographic profiles, systematic observation of online social media content across X, TikTok, Instagram and YouTube, and analysis of offline campaign materials including billboards and printed media. Methodological triangulation combines these in-depth interviews with systematic content analysis. Member checking was conducted by sharing preliminary findings and interpretive summaries with six key informants to verify whether interpretations accurately reflected their experiences and perspectives. An audit trail documenting all coding decisions, category revisions and analytical memos was maintained throughout the research process to support the reliability and confirmability of the findings.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### *The 2024 Presidential Election in Indonesia's Political Landscape*

Indonesia has adopted a presidential system, with elections held directly every five years. The 2024 presidential election is the 5th election with candidates: 1) Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar (National Democratic Party (Nasdem), National Awakening Party (PKB), Social Justice Party (PKS), and two non-parliamentary parties, namely the Ummat Party and the Masyumi Party, supporting parties); 2) Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka (Gerindra Party, Golkar Party, Democratic Party, National Mandate Party (PAN), Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), Crescent Star Party (PBB), and Garuda Party); and 3) Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), United Development Party (PPP), Perindo Party, and Hanura Party) (KPU, 2023).

The 2024 presidential election is controversial, with unpredictable political dynamics. First, there is debate and litigation over the 20% presidential threshold. Some view it as a restriction on citizens' constitutional rights to nominate potential candidates, potentially constraining the democratic process. The presidential threshold, regulated since 2004 election and amended in 2008 and 2017, sets the minimum requirement for percentage of seats in the House of Representatives or votes for political parties or coalitions of political parties to nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates (Arisyi & Wisnaeni, 2024). It aims to strengthen the presidential system, ensuring directly elected presidents and vice presidents hold a robust political position and are difficult to dismiss for political reasons. It seeks to enhance governmental effectiveness and streamline the multi-party system through natural selection (Gani et al., 2023)





Source: X @direktoridosen May 1, 2026

<https://x.com/direktoridosen/status/2050016559796834606>

Second, the proposed head regional election law revision by the House of Representative and government sparked protests and public rejection. It was considered an attempt to circumvent the Constitution and exploit loopholes for particular political power advantages (Adzkie, 2024) thereby restricting alternative presidential candidates and favoring certain parties or groups. It risks undermining democratic principles and eroding public trust in the electoral system's integrity. Third, Prabowo Subianto's participation in the presidential election for the third time followed his losses 2014 and 2019.

His defeats were partly attributed to public debates concerning human rights issues, particularly allegations of involvement in the disappearance of pro-democracy activists during the New Order (Orde Baru) period. The issue of political dynasties and the controversial military past also influenced public perception and raised skepticism about his leadership (Mietzner, 2014). After losing the 2014 election, Prabowo claimed that it was unfair and marred by systematic fraud, announcing his withdrawal from the election process and declaring the election results were invalid (Hadiprayitno, 2024). Although he did not file a formal lawsuit with the Constitutional Court, his statement created societal tensions and discussions on election integrity.

In the 2019 presidential election, Prabowo and his team were accused of negative campaigning, spreading divisive issues related to religious and ethnic identities. After losing, Prabowo filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court alleging systematic fraud, attracting public and media attention. The Constitutional Court rejected the lawsuit and confirmed that the election had been legally conducted. Despite this, the controversy highlighted Prabowo and his supporters' dissatisfaction with the election results. Surprisingly, Prabowo later accepted the offer as the Minister of Defense in Joko Widodo's cabinet (Amsori et al., 2024). A move that shocked his partisans, who viewed him as Jokowi's political opponent. This decision sparked criticism, with



some accusing him of betraying his campaign principles. Nonetheless, Prabowo justified his actions as an effort to reduce tension and polarization in society, known as Cebong and Kadrun, to maintain national unity.


Another controversy is his 2024 presidential election bid involves his vice-presidential candidate, Gibran Rakabuming Raka (President Joko Widodo's son), who served as Prabowo's vice-presidential candidate. His nomination generated significant public debate and ethical concerns regarding the legal process that enabled it (Yilmaz et al., 2024). However, the Constitutional Court revised this age requirement, ruling that candidates under 40 who currently hold or have previously held an elected regional office are eligible to run (Constitutional Court Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023). This decision was controversial because the presiding Chief Justice, Anwar Usman, is Gibran's maternal uncle, prompting public criticism over potential conflicts of interest (Hidayat, 2024). The Constitutional Court's decision, led by Anwar Usman (Gibran's uncle and President Joko Widodo's brother-in-law), raised concerns of conflict of interest and subjectivity. This decision faced significant opposition and controversy, even after their winning and inauguration as President and Vice President 2024-2029.

### *The practice of GenAI use in the 2024 election campaign*

As AI and elections constitute broad, rapidly developing topic, this part highlights AI use in Indonesia's presidential campaign. Political campaigns likely use AI for various purposes from targeted advertising to election forecasting. The 2024 Indonesian presidential election campaign period runs from November 28, 2023 to February 10, 2024, permitting limited meetings, face-to-face interactions, distribution of campaign materials, installation of campaign props in public places, debates between pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and social media engagement. From January 21 to February 10, 2024, campaigns were restricted to public meeting campaigns, print mass media advertisements, electronic mass media, and online media (*Portal Publikasi Pemilu Dan Pemilihan*, n.d.).

Indonesian presidential candidates in 2024 used digital technology through websites and applications as campaign tools, both official and volunteer initiated. The first candidate, Anies-Muhaimin (AMIN), employs the sites aminajadulu.com, haveaniesday.com, fitnahlagi.com and the Amin App (*Kubu Anies-Muhaimin Luncurkan AMIN App, Ini Fungsinya*, n.d.; *Timnas Luncurkan Aplikasi AMIN App Dan Aminajadulu*, n.d.). The second candidate, Prabowo-Gibran, uses website-based digital platforms, namely prabowogibran2.id, pilihmuda.id, prabowogibran.org, PR (*TKN Launching Platform AI Selfie Bareng Prabowo Dan Gibran*, n.d.) and Fotober2.AI (*TKN Launching Platform AI Selfie Bareng Prabowo Dan Gibran*, n.d.). The third candidate, Ganjar-Mahfud, uses ganjarmahfud03.id, and four applications: Super App GPMMD3 (Ganjar Pranowo- Mahfud MD 03), Oke Mas Ganjar (OMG), Ganjar Mahfud App, Jangkar Ganjar, and Ganjar Twin AI (Ganjar.AI) (*Cegah Disinformasi, TPN Ganjar-Mahfud Luncurkan Empat Aplikasi Digital - Kompas.Id*, n.d.).





Source: X @inboimie Jan 10, 2024  
<https://x.com/inboimie/status/1744928572928840150>

The websites and applications used by each candidate contain fundamentally similar information, including biographic details, accomplishments, track records, vision and mission statements, proposed work programs, campaign materials, news and agendas, contact information, legal team details, reporting mechanisms (for fact-checking or polling stations monitoring), and invitation for volunteer or supporter engagement (*Menilik Situs Anies-Cak Imin, Prabowo-Gibran, Dan Ganjar-Mahfud, Di Pilpres 2024 | Kumparan.Com*, n.d.). AMIN pair’s distinguishing campaign strategy is their non-utilization of GenAI, instead of relying more on illustrators’ work in their campaign as seen in a tweet dated January 10, 2024 contains information about AMIN’s mission footage regarding welfare provision and capacity building for health workers on X.




Source: X @aniesbaswedan Jan 10, 2024  
<https://x.com/aniesbaswedan/status/1744962010025193635>



The candidate pair's appreciation for illustrator's work is shown through consistent expression of gratitude and appropriate remuneration. The "Desak Anies in Bandung" edition of "Anies Discussion with Bandung Artists" emphasize that AMIN use human-created works rather than machines-generated content for campaign purposes and fulfill obligations to content producers. It elaborates that the state must appreciate human creativity and originality, with strict regulations regarding artists' intellectual property rights to ensure respect from both state and non-state entities, as well as promoting local artists' work (Baswedan, 2024).

In contrast, Ganjar-Mahfud and Prabowo-Gibran used GenAI in their campaign. Ganjar uses the Ganjar Twin AI application, colloquially referred to as Ganjar AI, which convey its vision, mission and 21 Sat Set Ganjar-Mahfud Programs to public. This application facilitates interaction with voters through AI chatbot and visual image manipulation, emulating Ganjar Pranowo's speaking style by processing and updating data from personal sources such as speeches, media statements, and biographical books.



Source: X @ViNNaRa1928 Dec 25, 2023

<https://x.com/ViNNaRa1928/status/1739080890796691779>

Prabowo-Gibran National Campaign Team launched two generative AI platforms: PRABOWOGIBRAN.AI and Fotober2.AI. PRABOWOGIBRAN.AI provides campaign materials for volunteers to deliver consistent messages, content and narratives to the public, reducing negative sentiments and countering misinformation targeting the candidates. It is web-based for easy access and aims to assist 10,000 regional volunteers and 15,000 cyber army volunteers in disseminating



GenAI campaign content to generate positive public sentiments (*Relawan Prabowo Gibran Luncurkan Platform AI Tekan Sentimen Negatif Dan Hoaks | Tempo.Co, n.d.*).



Source: X @CNNIDdaily Dec 22, 2023  
<https://x.com/CNNIDdaily/status/1738000052692652432>

The Fotober2.ai engages young people who lack direct access to Prabowo-Gibran. It facilitates closer interaction with the candidate through special selfie themes, fostering a sense of proximity between the pair and potential voters, such as graduation moments, mountain climbing, and shared coffee experiences. It was well received, achieving 2.5 million interactions and reaching 55 million viewers across social media platforms within 40 days of launching (Sosial et al., 2024).

Although Anies Baswedan did not utilize GenAI, he became a target of deepfake attacks. A voice recording resembling Surya Paloh, chairman of the Nasdem Party (Anies' supporting party), seemingly admonishing Anies post-presidential candidate debate went viral on social media. Another instance involved a deepfake video of Indonesia's deceased former president, Soeharto, encouraging support for Golkar, the party supporting Prabowo-Gibran, which some considered a factor in the candidate's electoral success (*AI 'Resurrects' Long Dead Dictator in Murky New Era of Deepfake Electioneering | CNN, n.d.; WR Numero Research, 2025*).



Source: X @NasDem Jan 22, 2024

<https://x.com/NasDem/status/1749443163868066014?t=pSNBUvZEplnQmk4fZqbAuA&s=09>

The use of deepfake AI during election campaign with deceased politicians has occurred in India to attract voters. Instances of deepfake technology impeding voter participants have occurred in New Hampshire, US and Pakistan (Thapa, n.d.). Cases of deepfake use for disinformation and fraudulent material have been documented in elections in Slovakia, South Korea, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Turkey and Belarus (Hasan, 2024).

The divergent approaches of Indonesian presidential candidates towards GenAI in campaigning elicited varied public responses. The AMIN pair and their team's alignment with illustration works received positive feedback on social media platforms, with users commending the campaign material as artistic creations rather than AI-generated image. Despite utilizing an application called Ganjar AI which uses AI, it received a relatively positive response. This may be attributed to the public's focus on image-based GenAI rather than text-based or potentially due to the observed negative sentiments from the public regarding the use of AI-generated images. As noted in posts on X and consistent with the campaign team's public statements, Ganjar had adjusted his approach by refraining from image-based GenAI use in subsequent campaign materials.

Ganjar-Mahfud's campaign is perceived to value illustrators' work and engage their services, rather than relying on GenAI images. The X account @slavoury expressed surprise upon creating an illustration depicting Ganjar-Mahfud with their backs to each other and a penguin icon adjacent to them, as Ganjar-Mahfud team purchased directly the work (reportedly providing sufficient compensation to cover college tuition), leading to its viral dissemination on social media and subsequent use on a billboard in Yogyakarta. As mentioned by Ganjar Pranowo on his X regarding their stance on Gen AI and human-created works, which are considered to possess greater vitality and artistic value.

*"Young people are indeed creative, thank you for making this. Hopefully more people will realize and be inspired to involve illustrators"*



*“Yes, the images from AI are good, but still handmade is more artful and feels more alive. Thank you. Made by illustrator friends, keep up the spirit for more great work”* (Ganjar Pranowo (@ganjarpranowo), 2024)



Source: X @ganjarpranowo Jan 19, 2024

<https://x.com/ganjarpranowo/status/1748306627705626795>

AMIN and Ganjar-Mahfud are perceived as supportive of artists' creative sensitivity to AI issues faced by artists. The Prabowo-Gibran pair received negative sentiments regarding the use of AI for national campaigns, as they were deemed aesthetically displeasing, lacking in quality, seeking immediate results, indifferent to artists, disrespectful of artwork and intellectual property rights, and limiting opportunities for creative individuals due to the campaign's use of AI. Furthermore, they were criticized for their delayed response to public opinion after receiving various criticism and severe comments.

Content creators' opposition to GenAI image-based gained prominence on X with the hashtag #TolakGambarAI (#RejectAIImage). Rejection is considered an unauthorized appropriation of artists' work, despite copyright protection, particularly concerning the AI image use for commercial purposes such as advertisement, posters, and campaign billboards. Although opposition is substantial, many internet users defend AI images, arguing that AI represents technological innovation. Proponents suggest artists should refrain from uploading work online to prevent AI use, acknowledging risks of online publication.





Source: X @sulkycatz Feb 6, 2024


<https://x.com/sulkycatz/status/1754691362371625363>

### *The Practice of AI Use in the 2024 Election Campaign*

As AI and elections constitute broad, rapidly developing topic, this part highlights AI use in Indonesia's presidential campaign. Political campaigns likely use AI for various purposes from targeted advertising to election forecasting. The 2024 Indonesian presidential election campaign period runs from November 28, 2023 to February 10, 2024, permitting limited meetings, face-to-face interactions, distribution of campaign materials, installation of campaign props in public places, debates between pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and social media engagement. From January 21 to February 10, 2024, campaigns were restricted to public meeting campaigns, print mass media advertisements, electronic mass media, and online media (*Portal Publikasi Pemilu Dan Pemilihan*, n.d.).

Indonesian presidential candidates in 2024 use digital technology through websites and applications as campaign tools, both official and volunteer initiated. The first candidate, Anies-Muhaimin (AMIN), employs the sites aminajadulu.com, haveaniesday.com, fitnahlagi.com and the Amin App (*Kubu Anies-Muhaimin Luncurkan AMIN App, Ini Fungsinya*, n.d.; *Timnas Luncurkan Aplikasi AMIN App Dan Aminajadulu*, n.d.). The second candidate, Prabowo-Gibran, uses website-based digital platforms, namely prabowogibran2.id, pilihmuda.id, prabowogibran.org, PRABOWOGIBRAN.AI and Fotober2.AI (*TKN Launching Platform AI Selfie Bareng Prabowo Dan Gibran*, n.d.). The third candidate, Ganjar-Mahfud, uses ganjarmahfud03.id, and four applications: Super App GPMMD3 (Ganjar Pranowo- Mahfud MD 03), Oke Mas Ganjar (OMG), Ganjar Mahfud App, Jangkar Ganjar, and Ganjar Twin AI (Ganjar.AI) (*Cegah Disinformasi, TPN Ganjar-Mahfud Luncurkan Empat Aplikasi Digital - Kompas.Id*, n.d.).





Source: X @inboimie Jan 10, 2024  
<https://x.com/inboimie/status/1744928572928840150>

The websites and applications used by each candidate contain fundamentally similar information, including biographic details, accomplishments, track records, vision and mission statements, proposed work programs, campaign materials, news and agendas, contact information, legal team details, reporting mechanisms (for fact-checking or polling stations monitoring), and invitation for volunteer or supporter engagement (*Menilik Situs Anies-Cak Imin, Prabowo-Gibran, Dan Ganjar-Mahfud, Di Pilpres 2024 | Kumparan.Com, n.d.*). AMIN pair’s distinguishing campaign strategy is their non-utilization of GenAI, instead of relying more on illustrators’ work in their campaign as seen in a tweet dated January 10, 2024 contains information about AMIN's mission footage regarding welfare provision and capacity building for health workers on X.




Source: X @aniesbaswedan Jan 10, 2024  
<https://x.com/aniesbaswedan/status/1744962010025193635>



The candidate pair's appreciation for illustrator's work is shown through consistent expression of gratitude and appropriate remuneration. The "Desak Anies in Bandung" edition of "Anies Discussion with Bandung Artists" emphasize that AMIN use human-created works rather than machines-generated content for campaign purposes and fulfill obligations to content producers. It elaborates that the state must appreciate human creativity and originality, with strict regulations regarding artists' intellectual property rights to ensure respect from both state and non-state entities, as well as promoting local artists' work (Baswedan, 2024).

In contrast, Ganjar-Mahfud and Prabowo-Gibran used GenAI in their campaign. Ganjar uses the Ganjar Twin AI application, colloquially referred to as Ganjar AI, which convey its vision, mission and 21 Sat Set Ganjar-Mahfud Programs to public. This application facilitates interaction with voters through AI chatbot and visual image manipulation, emulating Ganjar Pranowo's speaking style by processing and updating data from personal sources such as speeches, media statements, and biographical books.



Source: X @ViNNaRa1928 Dec 25, 2023

<https://x.com/ViNNaRa1928/status/1739080890796691779>

Prabowo-Gibran National Campaign Team launched two generative AI platforms: PRABOWOGIBRAN.AI and Fotober2.AI. PRABOWOGIBRAN.AI provides campaign materials for volunteers to deliver consistent messages, content and narratives to the public, reducing negative sentiments and countering misinformation targeting the candidates. It is web-based for easy access and aims to assist 10,000 regional volunteers and 15,000 cyber army volunteers in disseminating



GenAI campaign content to generate positive public sentiments (*Relawan Prabowo Gibran Luncurkan Platform AI Tekan Sentimen Negatif Dan Hoaks | Tempo.Co, n.d.*).




Source: X @CNNIDdaily Dec 22, 2023

<https://x.com/CNNIDdaily/status/1738000052692652432>

The Fotober2.ai engages young people who lack direct access to Prabowo-Gibran. It facilitates closer interaction with the candidate through special selfie themes, fostering a sense of proximity between the pair and potential voters, such as graduation moments, mountain climbing, and shared coffee experiences. It was well received, achieving 2.5 million interactions and reaching 55 million viewers across social media platforms within 40 days of launching (Sosial et al., 2024).

Although Anies Baswedan did not utilize GenAI, he became a target of deepfake attacks. A voice recording resembling Surya Paloh, chairman of the Nasdem Party (Anies' supporting party), seemingly admonishing Anies post-presidential candidate debate went viral on social media. Another instance involved a deepfake video of Indonesia's deceased former president, Soeharto, encouraging support for Golkar, the party supporting Prabowo-Gibran, the spread of which coincided with the campaign period, though establishing a direct causal link between this deepfake content and electoral outcomes lies beyond the scope of this study (*AI 'Resurrects' Long Dead Dictator in Murky New Era of Deepfake Electioneering | CNN, n.d.; WR Numero Research, 2025*).



Source: X @NasDem Jan 22, 2024

<https://x.com/NasDem/status/1749443163868066014?t=pSNBUvZEplnQmk4fZqbAuA&s=09>

The use of deepfake AI during election campaign with deceased politicians has occurred in India to attract voters. Instances of deepfake technology impeding voter participants have occurred in New Hampshire, US and Pakistan (Thapa, n.d.). Cases of deepfake use for disinformation and fraudulent material have been documented in elections in Slovakia, South Korea, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Turkey and Belarus (Hasan, 2024).

The divergent approaches of Indonesian presidential candidates towards GenAI in campaigning elicited varied public responses. The AMIN pair and their team's alignment with illustration works received positive feedback on social media platforms, with users commending the campaign material as artistic creations rather than AI-generated image. Despite utilizing an application called Ganjar AI which uses AI, it received a relatively positive response. This may be attributed to the public's focus on image-based GenAI rather than text-based or potentially due to the observed negative sentiments from the public regarding the use of AI-generated images. As noted on X, Ganjar had purportedly learned from experience and sought to improve his approach by refraining from image-based GenAI use.

Ganjar-Mahfud's campaign is perceived to value illustrators' work and engage their services, rather than relying on GenAI images. The X account @slavoury expressed surprise upon creating an illustration depicting Ganjar-Mahfud with their backs to each other and a penguin icon adjacent to them, as Ganjar-Mahfud team purchased directly the work (reportedly providing sufficient compensation to cover college tuition), leading to its viral dissemination on social media and subsequent use on a billboard in Yogyakarta. As mentioned by Ganjar Pranowo on his X regarding their stance on Gen AI and human-created works, which are considered to possess greater vitality and artistic value.



*“Young people are indeed creative, thank you for making this. Hopefully more people will realize and be inspired to involve illustrators”*

*“Yes, the images from AI are good, but still handmade is more artful and feels more alive. Thank you. Made by illustrator friends, keep up the spirit for more great work”*  
(Ganjar Pranowo (@ganjarpranowo), 2024)



Source: X @ganjarpranowo Jan 19, 2024

<https://x.com/ganjarpranowo/status/1748306627705626795>

AMIN and Ganjar-Mahfud are perceived as supportive of artists' creative sensitivity to AI issues faced by artists. The Prabowo-Gibran pair received negative sentiments regarding the use of AI for national campaigns, as they were deemed aesthetically displeasing, lacking in quality, seeking immediate results, indifferent to artists, disrespectful of artwork and intellectual property rights, and limiting opportunities for creative individuals due to the campaign's use of AI. Furthermore, they were criticized for their delayed response to public opinion after receiving various criticism and severe comments.

Content creators' opposition to GenAI image-based gained prominence on X with the hashtag #TolakGambarAI (#RejectAIImage). Rejection is considered an unauthorized appropriation of artists' work, despite copyright protection, particularly concerning the AI image use for commercial purposes such as advertisement, posters, and campaign billboards. Although opposition is substantial, many internet users defend AI images, arguing that AI represents technological innovation. Proponents suggest artists should refrain from uploading work online to prevent AI use, acknowledging risks of online publication.



Source: X @sulkycatz Feb 6, 2024

<https://x.com/sulkycatz/status/1754691362371625363>

### *AI Regulation in Elections*

Despite polemics over AI use, at the time of writing this article, Indonesia has no regulations governing AI use. The only AI-related election regulation is a circular letter from Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (No.9 of 2023 concerning Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, on December 19, 2023) encouraging AI users to provide watermarks indicating AI-generated content. The Election Supervisory Agency acknowledged tardiness in addressing AI use in campaigns and plan to formulate AI campaign arrangements with stakeholders for 2024 regional head elections (*Kementerian Komunikasi Dan Digital*, n.d.).

Election campaign regulations in Indonesia remain subject to the Electronic Information and Transactions Law and Personal Data Protection Act. Social media campaigns are governed by the General Election Commission Regulation number 15 of 2023 (articles 37 and 38). Regarding AI use in campaign, the Indonesian Minister of Communication and Information added that:

*"We are not violating AI in any form. The important thing is that you declare, when there is a dispute or problem, as long as it does not violate the Electronic Information and Transactions Law and Personal Data Protection act, it is not legally imposed. This Circular Letter is a kind of initial introduction, until a legally binding law or regulation from AI can be made and decided to apply to the territory of Indonesia"* (*Ramai Kampanye Pemilu 2024 Di Tengah Tren AI, Menkominfo Pesankan Ini - Page 2 - Tekno Liputan6.Com*, n.d.).

In response to this situation, the Election Care Advocacy Team (TAPP) submitted a judicial review of Law Number 7/2017 on General Elections to the Constitutional Court (MK). The lawsuit addresses three legal issues, including the absence of regulations prohibiting AI use in political campaign. The lack of guidelines for election participants regarding the use of self-image in the form images, photographs, audio, or video with digital manipulation of excessive AI-assisted technology could manipulate voters' perception of candidates and lead to misinformed voting



decisions. This contradicts the principle of honest election by creating a misinformation detrimental to voters (*Penggunaan AI Dalam Kampanye Tak Dilarang, UU Pemilu Digugat Ke MK*, n.d.).




Source: X @romawijawa Dec 15, 2023

<https://x.com/romawijawa/status/1735678030167568743>

Regulations on AI use in elections and campaigns vary across countries. The EU represent forefront of AI regulation, with the AI Act approved in March 2024 (*EU AI Act: First Regulation on Artificial Intelligence | Topics | European Parliament*, n.d.; *Global AI Regulations Tracker: Europe, Americas & Asia-Pacific Overview*, n.d.; Rabitsch & Calabrese, 2024). The US lacks federal legislation, but several states have implemented regulations. At least 26 states have enacted AI laws, including Wisconsin, California, Texas, Michigan, Utah, Washington, Florida, Canada, while others, such as Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and North Carolina are considering AI regulation (Power, n.d.; *These States Are Trying to Crack down on AI Use in Elections*, n.d.)). These regulations generally cover mandatory disclosure of AI use, prohibition of AI-generated political messages before election, and disclosure of metadata.



German Marshall Fund   
@gmfus

Follow



The EU's AI Act takes a horizontal, risk-based approach and bans AI uses that pose "unacceptable risk" and introduces risk mitigation and oversight for "high-risk" systems.

Read GMF's [@juliatrehu](#)'s piece on what to expect on AI regulation in the EU here.

[bit.ly/48j7pBd](https://bit.ly/48j7pBd)

10:40 PM · Dec 14, 2023 · 634 Views

Source: X [@gmfus](#) Dec 14, 2023

<https://x.com/gmfus/status/1735323764500414902>

Conversely, the UK, several African countries (including South Africa and Nigeria), Australia, Switzerland, Taiwan and South Korea lack specific laws regulating AI in elections; these jurisdictions have instead integrated AI-related provisions into existing electoral laws or employed ethical principles and guidelines to govern AI use in campaigns. Australia and South Korea consider AI-generated content to be an offense under their respective Electoral Act if disseminated during election period (*Chapter 2 - Impacts of AI on Democracy – Parliament of Australia*, n.d.; WR Numero Research, 2025). The UK has the NCSC's Defending Democracy mitigation guidelines to address this concern.

### *AI, Identity, and Digital Democracy*

The Prabowo-Gibran campaign used AI visual media, including photos and videos, as campaign tools on both traditional and digital media platforms, such as billboards, apparel, and stickers, to appeal to youth voters. Analysed through a visual semiotics lens Joffe (2008), the GenAI anime character depicting Prabowo operates on two semiotic levels: denotatively, it presents a softened, child-like physical representation; connotatively, it activates associations of harmlessness, approachability, and warmth that contrast sharply with Prabowo's prior militaristic public image. This anime character depicts Prabowo with a round physique and chubby cheeks, resembling a child figure. This representation reinforces the colloquial epithet "gemoy" bestowed upon Prabowo by the public and internet users. The term "gemoy" denotes an entity or individual possessing a cute and adorable character. This term was adopted by Prabowo Gibran's national campaign team and integrated into the official campaign strategy, achieving viral status on social media platforms, particularly TikTok.

Prabowo's "gemoy" was featured in a various campaign material, including a video advertisement showcasing Prabowo-Gibran's dancing with citizens, accompanied by a dangdut-style musical composition titled "'Yo mung Prabowo Gibran (only Prabowo Gibran)". A specialized "Joged Gemoy (Gemoy dance)" was performed by Prabowo, accompanied by a modified viral song repurposed as campaign material. The character also appeared in a dairy product advertisement, with Prabowo's AI avatar attired in a brown hat and primary school uniform. "Gemoy" became



Prabowo's distinctive branding in the 2024 General Election, disseminated across various media, including billboards, television advertisements, apparel, and augmented reality filters on TikTok.




Source: X @voaindonesia Feb 8, 2024

<https://x.com/voaindonesia/status/1755562127082094742>

The entertainment-based campaign strategy employing "Gemoy" tagline to promote joyful political engagement (Mubarrod & Syarwi, 2024). It is considered instrumental in facilitating Prabowo's outreach to a broader demographic, particularly young and first-time voters with distinct characteristics and preferences compared to previous generations. The youth demographic demonstrates a preference for campaign content that is attractive, engaging, innovative, informative, persuasive and positive.

According to Google Indonesia's "Artificial Intelligence in Indonesia" survey (published 2023; n = approximately 1,000 respondents; methodology: online panel), 43% of AI users in Indonesia are young individuals, representing the most AI-adaptive demographic (*Survei Google Ungkap 43 Persen Gen Z Indonesia Melek Teknologi AI*, n.d.). This aligns with Indikator Politik Indonesia's exit poll, which found 71% of generation Z respondents voted for Prabowo (*Survei Indikator: Pemilihan Prabowo Banyak Dari Gen Z Dan Milenial, Pemilihan Ganjar Didominasi Kalangan Tua Halaman All - Kompas.Com*, n.d.) making young people the largest contributor to the Prabowo-Gibran victory.



Source: Databoks July 24, 2023

<https://databoks.katadata.co.id/pendidikan/statistik/e6274ace8968184/survei-indikator-prabowo-unggul-di-kalangan-pemilih-gen-z-milenial-dan-baby-boomers>

This phenomenon shows technological advancement can alter an individual’s public image. Prabowo's image in the 2014 and 2019 elections, perceived as authoritative, militaristic, stern, temperamental, resolute and unyielding in demeanor, transformed in the 2024 elections to an amiable figure, smiling, and dancing on stage. AI use to enhance Prabowo's approachable image may have contributed to softening public perception of his controversial military record, including his dismissal as Commander General of the Army Special Forces Command due to human rights violations during the 1998 reformasi. However, this interpretation should be substantiated with interview data or social media metrics rather than treated as a definitive causal claim. Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting’s December 2023 study found public awareness of these cases was only 38% (*Kecerdasan Buatan Dalam Kampanye Politik*, n.d.).

GenAI use to soften Prabowo's image shows AI technology influences competing political narratives, advantaging the party employing it. Digital avatars made Prabowo's image more positive, modern, open and relatable, rendering him more approachable and facilitating easier interaction compared to his previous military persona. This strategy successfully diminished negative perceptions about past human rights violations often used by his political opponents as basis for criticism.

Endearing or humorous content tends to achieve viral status on social media. An approachable “*gemoy*” branding strategy can significantly increase campaign exposure through digital platforms. As mentioned by Joffe (2008) visual content plays a central role in creating emotional and visual appeal, increasing engagement and responses from voters, especially with narrative messages promoting certain values to young voters and first-time voters.

The emotional connection through the “*gemoy*” symbol can elicit positive emotions fostering loyalty and support from voters. This relational dimension contributes to constructing public perception of Prabowo's new identity. A novel identity can emerge within a specific interaction when acknowledged by others, which Castell address as project identity. Project identity



refers to an identity wherein social actors formulate a new identity determining a novel societal position (Deaux, 1993; Widjaja et al., 2021).



Source: X @voaindonesia Feb 9, 2024  
<https://x.com/voaindonesia/status/1755818842218201345>

The use of GenAI disseminated across various digital media platforms exemplifies the process of digital democracy. Social media, providing access to diverse people from various social, economic, and cultural backgrounds, has facilitated multiple forms of political participation for individual (Prawira et al., 2024b) both supportive and opposed to GenAI in the electoral process. For those not objecting to AI, online political participation extends beyond receiving political information to expressing opinions, supporting the notion that campaigning using AI as innovative and engaging, mentioning candidates or their teams, and sharing political content aligned.

Those opposing GenAI undertook several actions. Besides expressing objections and appreciating candidates using illustrators, they shared aligned content and engaged in digital activism through the #TolakGambarAI (#RejectAIImage) movement. This represents a protest against AI use by one candidate pairs. Internet user's response also manifested in a volunteer movement by illustrators supporting candidates not using GenAI, creating campaign materials like 3D cube animation, scribble drawing, idol manga, and animated videos. Netizens' participation demonstrates support for the recognition, though not indicating votes.



Source X @an\_aevii Jan 30, 2024  
[https://x.com/an\\_aevii/status/1752138355352228322](https://x.com/an_aevii/status/1752138355352228322)



From anthropological perspective which examines electoral processes as cultural performances that constitute and legitimise power (Kimberley, 2004; McLeod, 1999), AI's role in elections transcends technological advancement, representing a cultural phenomenon that reshapes power dynamics and social interactions. Campaign activities and volunteers' efforts on social media have raised awareness among some candidates, public and relevant parties, prompting regulations development for AI use in election. The increasing awareness of AI's potential coincided with public concerns about future of democracy, particularly AI's capacity to undermine electoral process. In Indonesian elections, the use of GenAI to construct a candidate pair's new identity shifted focus from substantive matters to self-image promotion through biased visual content, depriving the public of political education on ideas, vision and mission for Indonesia's future.

An additional challenge to the influence of AI in the electoral process is the emergence of deepfakes, which can confuse or mislead the public. UNRIC (2024) explained that AI can impact the democratic process because integrity and security in the electoral process, such as public comments on social media, political advertising and fundraising, election administration, voter suppression, and the information environment for elections (Hasan, 2024), are subject to design and direction by certain parties.

Connective action outlines how social media facilitates a more personalized and participatory mobilization as digital media now functions as both a communication channel and an active agent shaping political narratives (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012b; Mirbabaie et al., 2021; Prawira et al., 2024a). With technological advancement blurring the distinction between human-created works and AI-generated content, it is crucial to acknowledge that the readiness of Indonesia's people to critically evaluate information disseminated through digital media is essential for fostering a healthier and more equitable democratic culture.

## CONCLUSION

Generative AI has transformed the landscape of political campaigns in Indonesia, offering new strategies and tools for constructing identities that can reach and engage voters during the 2024 Indonesian presidential election. The three pairs of presidential candidates adopted different approaches to GenAI: AMIN rejected AI in favour of human illustrators; Ganjar-Mahfud used text-based AI chatbots while distancing themselves from image-based AI; and Prabowo-Gibran extensively used GenAI visual media to create a new 'gemoy' identity, which proved particularly popular with young and first-time voters.

Rejection and support for GenAI emerged from various parties, including presidential candidates, the public and relevant stakeholders. This is evident in digital activism using the hashtag #TolakGambarAI on X, highlighting tensions between technological innovation and the protection of artists' intellectual property rights. GenAI, facilitated by social media, presents opportunities and challenges to the digital democratic process. While open access enables broader public participation and increases awareness of AI's role in electoral processes, the threat of biased and superficial campaigns ones that prioritise image over substance increasingly poses risks to the realisation of a healthy and fair democratic culture.

This study contributes to the growing body of literature on AI and democratic processes, particularly in the Global South, by providing empirical evidence. However, several limitations should be acknowledged. First, data collection was retrospective for the post-campaign period, which may have introduced recall bias in interview responses. Second, the social media content analysis was limited to publicly accessible posts on selected platforms (X, TikTok, Instagram, YouTube), and platform



algorithms may have influenced content visibility and sampling. Third, interviews with political partisans carry inherent risk of partisan bias, which the researcher sought to mitigate through diverse profile selection and member checking, but cannot fully eliminate. Fourth, the rapidly evolving nature of AI tools and regulatory responses means that some findings may require updating as the regulatory landscape develops. Future research should examine the long-term effects of AI-constructed political identities on democratic culture, voter critical literacy and the development of AI regulatory frameworks. As technological advancements continue to blur the distinction between human-created works and AI-generated content, it is essential to foster critical digital literacy among Indonesian citizens to sustain a robust democratic culture.

## REFERENCES

- Adzkie, A. (2024, August 24). *Protes revisi UU Pilkada: "Ini bukan negara milik keluarga tertentu."* [https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/extra/gnlj45vx6z/protes\\_ruu\\_pilkada](https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/extra/gnlj45vx6z/protes_ruu_pilkada)
- AI 'resurrects' long dead dictator in murky new era of deepfake electioneering | CNN. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/asia/suharto-deepfake-ai-scam-indonesia-election-hnk-intl/index.html>
- Amsori, A., Yuswarni, Y., Yandra, A., Aryanto, A., Karim, M., & Arizal, A. (2024). Changes in Coalition Patterns of Ideological Political Parties to Transactional Pragmatists President Joko Widodo's Leadership Period 2014-2024. *ARISTO*, 12(3), 681–706. <https://doi.org/10.24269/ARS.V12I3.8996>
- Arisyi, W. A., & Wisnaeni, F. (2024). Practice of Presidential Threshold in the Implementation of Presidential and Vice Presidential General Elections and Its Implications on the Political Rights of Citizens and Political Parties in Indonesia. *International Journal of Social Science and Human Research*, 7(09). <https://doi.org/10.47191/IJSSHR/V7-I09-13>
- Bahri, P. R., Asmara, H. M. G., & Risnain, Muh. (2024). Artificial Intelligence (AI)-Based Campaign in the Implementation of General Elections. *RESEARCH REVIEW International Journal of Multidisciplinary*, 9(2), 117–127. <https://doi.org/10.31305/rrijm.2024.v09.n02.012>
- Baswedan, A. (2024). *Anies Didesak 7 Seniman dan Budayawan* [Broadcast]. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xncjj4-1sU8>
- Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012a). The Logic of Connective Action: Digital Media and the Personalization of Contentious Politics. *Information Communication and Society*, 15(5), 739–768. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661>
- Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012b). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. *Information Communication and Society*, 15(5), 739–768. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2012.670661>
- Can artificial intelligence (AI) influence elections?* (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://unric.org/en/can-artificial-intelligence-ai-influence-elections/>
- Castells, M. C. (2010). *The Rise of Network Society: I*. Eiley Bkckwell. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-60327-951-2>
- Cegah Disinformasi, TPN Ganjar-Mahfud Luncurkan Empat Aplikasi Digital - Kompas.id*. (n.d.). Retrieved January 30, 2025, from <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2024/01/05/cegah-disinformasi-tpn-ganjar-mahfud-luncurkan-empat-aplikasi-digital>
- Chapter 2 - Impacts of AI on democracy – Parliament of Australia*. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from [https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary\\_Business/Committees/Senate/Adopting\\_Artificial\\_Intelligence\\_AI/AdoptingAI/Interim\\_report/Chapter\\_2\\_-\\_Impacts\\_of\\_AI\\_on\\_democracy](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Adopting_Artificial_Intelligence_AI/AdoptingAI/Interim_report/Chapter_2_-_Impacts_of_AI_on_democracy)
- Deaux, K. (1993). Reconstructing Social Identity. *https://Doi.Org/10.1177/0146167293191001*, 19(1), 4–12. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167293191001>



- EU AI Act: first regulation on artificial intelligence | Topics | European Parliament.* (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20230601STO93804/eu-ai-act-first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence>
- Ford, E. J. (2008). Life on the Campaign Trail: The Political Anthropology of Local Politics. *USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations*. <https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/245>
- Gani, M. A., Fadli, Y., Nurlukman, A. D., & Sarofah, R. (2023). Actors' Approach in the Discourse of Rejecting the Threshold for Presidential Candidacy in General Elections in Indonesia. *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review*, 8(3), 368–383.
- Ganjar Pranowo (@ganjarpranowo). (2024). Iya, gambar dari AI bagus-bagus, tapi tetep buatan tangan lebih nyeni dan rosone lebih hidup. Makasih mba @jejenjreng. Buat teman-teman Ilustrator, terus semangat utk karya yg lebih hebat👍👍👍. In X. X. <https://x.com/ganjarpranowo/status/1748306627705626795>
- Global AI Regulations Tracker: Europe, Americas & Asia-Pacific Overview.* (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://legalnodes.com/article/global-ai-regulations-tracker>
- Grigoryan, T. (2024). Short essay: Current issues in digital ethnography: is all ethnography digital? *Journal of Organizational Ethnography*, 13(1), 19–28. <https://doi.org/10.1108/JOE-02-2024-0008>
- Hadiprayitno, I. (2024). Systematic fraud: Tempo coverage of Indonesia's presidential election 2024. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 16(2), 298–305. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ASPP.12735>
- Hasan, S. (2024, June 6). *The Effect of AI on Elections Around the World and What to Do About It*. <https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/effect-ai-elections-around-world-and-what-do-about-it>
- Hidayat, M. M. (2024). The 2024 General Elections in Indonesia: Issues of Political Dynasties, Electoral Fraud, and The Emergence of A National Protest Movements. *IAS Journal of Localities*, 2(1), 33–51. <https://doi.org/10.62033/IASJOL.V2I1.51>
- Hine, C. (2000). *Virtual Ethnography*. SAGE Publications Ltd. <https://doi.org/10.4135/9780857020277>
- Inie, N., Falk, J., & Tanimoto, S. (2023). Designing Participatory AI: Creative Professionals' Worries and Expectations about Generative AI. *Extended Abstracts of the 2023 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3544549.3585657>
- Joffe, H. (2008). The power of visual material: Persuasion, emotion and identification. *Diogenes*, 55(1), 84–93. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0392192107087919>
- Jungherr, A., Rauchfleisch, A., & Wuttke, A. (2024). *Deceptive uses of Artificial Intelligence in elections strengthen support for AI ban*. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.12613v1>
- Kane, T. B. (2019). Artificial Intelligence in Politics: Establishing Ethics. *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine*, 38(1), 72–80. <https://doi.org/10.1109/MTS.2019.2894474>
- Kecerdasan Buatan dalam Kampanye Politik.* (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://interaktif.tempo.co/proyek/kecerdasan-buatan-dalam-kampanye-politik/>
- Kementerian Komunikasi dan Digital.* (n.d.). Retrieved January 30, 2025, from <https://www.komdigi.go.id/berita/siaran-pers/detail/siaran-pers-no-287-hm-kominfo-04-2024-tentang-kominfo-dorong-pemanfaatan-teknologi-ai-secara-etis>
- Kimberley, A. C. (2004). Election Day: The Construction of Democracy through Technique. *Cultural Anthropology*, 19(4), 551–580. <https://doi.org/10.1525/CAN.2004.19.4.551>
- KPU. (2023, November 13). *KPU Tetapkan Tiga Pasangan Calon Presiden dan Wakil Presiden Pemilu 2024*. <https://www.kpu.go.id/berita/baca/12081/kpu-tetapkan-tiga-pasangan-calon-presiden-dan-wakil-presiden-pemilu-2024>
- Kubu Anies-Muhaimin Luncurkan AMIN App, Ini Fungsinya.* (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/trio-hamdani/kubu-anies-muhaimin-luncurkan-amin-app-ini-fungsinya>



- Menilik Situs Anies-Cak Imin, Prabowo-Gibran, dan Ganjar-Mahfud, di Pilpres 2024* | *kumparan.com*. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://kumparan.com/kumparannews/menilik-situs-anies-cak-imin-prabowo-gibran-dan-ganjar-mahfud-di-pilpres-2024-21qilTsEYoP>
- Messer, U. (2025). How do people react to political bias in generative artificial intelligence (AI)? *Computers in Human Behavior: Artificial Humans*, 3, 100108. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbah.2024.100108>
- Mietzner, M. (2014). Indonesia's 2014 Elections: How Jokowi Won and Democracy Survived. *Journal of Democracy*, 25(4), 111–125. <https://doi.org/10.1353/JOD.2014.0073>
- Mirbabaie, M., Brünker, F., Wischniewski, M., & Meinert, J. (2021). The Development of Connective Action during Social Movements on Social Media. *ACM Transactions on Social Computing*, 4(1), 1–21. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3446981>
- Moncallo, S. H. (2021). *No Laughing Matters: Struggles in Identity Work of Venezuelan Stand-Up Comedians in Mexico City*.
- Mubarrod, R., & Syarwi, P. (2024). Marketing politik jelang Pemilu 2024 “Desak Anies”, “Prabowo Gemoy”, dan “Ganjar Nginap di Rumah Warga”. *Communitarian : Jurnal Prodi Ilmu Politik*, 5(2). <https://doi.org/10.56985/JC.V5I2.492>
- Novelli, C., & Sandri, G. (2024). Digital Democracy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
- P, D., Simoes, S., & MacCarthaigh, M. (2023). AI and core electoral processes: Mapping the horizons. *AI Magazine*, 44(3), 218–239. <https://doi.org/10.1002/aaai.12105>
- Penggunaan AI dalam Kampanye Tak Dilarang, UU Pemilu Digugat ke MK*. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://www.inews.id/news/nasional/penggunaan-ai-dalam-kampanye-tak-dilarang-uu-pemilu-digugat-ke-mk/2>
- Portal Publikasi Pemilu dan Pemilihan*. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from [https://infopemilu.kpu.go.id/Pemilu/Peserta\\_pemilu](https://infopemilu.kpu.go.id/Pemilu/Peserta_pemilu)
- Power, R. (n.d.). *REGULATING THE USE OF AI IN ELECTIONS-EXAMPLES FROM OTHER STATES STATE ADMINISTRATION AND VETERANS' AFFAIRS IN THE RIM COMMITTEE PREPARED BY REBECCA C. POWERS-MAY 2024*. Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns>
- Prawira, Y., Sumartias, S., Suryana, A., & Damayani, N. A. (2024a). Political Influencers in Online Political Participation: Strategies and Challenges on Social Media Platforms. *International Journal of Religion*, 5(10), 5485–5494. <https://doi.org/10.61707/WZ4A1G03>
- Prawira, Y., Sumartias, S., Suryana, A., & Damayani, N. A. (2024b). THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL INFLUENCER ON ONLINE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN TWITTER/X. *Forum for Linguistic Studies*, 6(2), 304–316. <https://doi.org/10.24294/fls.v6i2.2135>
- Rabitsch, A., & Calabrese, S. (2024). *The EU's Artificial Intelligence Act and its Impact on Electoral Processes: a Human Rights-Based Approach 1. European Legal framework covering Artificial Intelligence (AI) in elections 4 1.1 The Digital Services Act (DSA) 5 1.2 The Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (TPA) 7 1.3 The Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) 8 1.4 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)*.
- Ramai Kampanye Pemilu 2024 di Tengah Tren AI, Menkominfo Pesankan Ini - Page 2 - Tekno Liputan6.com*. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://www.liputan6.com/tekno/read/5488417/ramai-kampanye-pemilu-2024-di-tengah-tren-ai-menkominfo-pesankan-ini?page=2>
- Relawan Prabowo Gibran Luncurkan Platform AI Tekan Sentimen Negatif dan Hoaks* | *tempo.co*. (n.d.). Retrieved January 30, 2025, from <https://www.tempo.co/digital/-relawan-prabowo-gibran-luncurkan-platform-ai-tekan-sentimen-negatif-dan-hoaks-105969>
- Roemmele, A., & Gibson, R. (2020). Scientific and subversive: The two faces of the fourth era of political campaigning. *New Media and Society*, 22(4), 595–610. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444819893979>



- Sosial, M., Aplikasi, D., Buatan, K., Preferensi, D., Partisipasi, D., Di, P., Umum, P., Hariyani, N., & Rahmawati, A. Y. (2024). Media Sosial dan Aplikasi Kecerdasan Buatan Dalam Preferensi dan Partisipasi Pemilih Di Pemilihan Umum. *INTELEKTUAL (E-Journal Administrasi Publik Dan Ilmu Komunikasi)*, 11(2), 102–111. <https://doi.org/10.55499/INTELEKTUAL.V11I02.1210>
- Survei Google Ungkap 43 Persen Gen Z Indonesia Melek Teknologi AI. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://www.idxchannel.com/technology/survei-google-ungkap-43-persen-gen-z-indonesia-melek-teknologi-ai>
- Survei Indikator: Pemilih Prabowo Banyak dari Gen Z dan Milenial, Pemilih Ganjar Didominasi Kalangan Tua Halaman all - Kompas.com. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/02/21/17550901/survei-indikator-pemilih-prabowo-banyak-dari-gen-z-dan-milenial-pemilih?page=all>
- Thapa, M. J. (n.d.). The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Elections. *IJFMR240217524*, 6(2). <https://doi.org/10.1002/aaai.12110>>accessed
- These states are trying to crack down on AI use in elections. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://www.axios.com/2024/09/22/ai-regulation-election-laws-map>
- Timnas Luncurkan Aplikasi AMIN App dan Aminajadulu. (n.d.). Retrieved January 30, 2025, from <https://news.detik.com/foto-news/d-7127328/timnas-luncurkan-aplikasi-amin-app-dan-aminajadulu>
- Tinnirello, M. (Ed.). (2022). *The global politics of artificial intelligence*. Routledge. <https://www.routledge.com/The-Global-Politics-of-Artificial-Intelligence/Tinnirello/p/book/9781138314573>
- TKN Launching Platform AI Selfie Bareng Prabowo dan Gibran. (n.d.). Retrieved February 1, 2025, from <https://news.detik.com/pemilu/d-7121447/tnk-launching-platform-ai-selfie-bareng-prabowo-dan-gibran>
- Ulicane, I., & Erkkilä, T. (2023). Politics and policy of Artificial Intelligence. *Review of Policy Research*, 40(5), 612–625. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ropr.12574>
- Widjaja, P. S., Wibowo, D. P. A., & Geovasky, I. (2021). Politik Identitas dan Religiusitas Perdamaian Berbasis Pancasila di Ruang Publik. *GEMA TEOLOGIKA: Jurnal Teologi Kontekstual Dan Filsafat Keilahian*, 6(1), 95. <https://doi.org/10.21460/GEMA.2021.61.658>
- WR Numero Research. (2025). *AI in elections in East and Southeast Asia*.
- Yilmaz, I., Triwibowo, W., Bachtiar, H., & Barton, G. (2024). *Competing Populisms, Digital Technologies and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia*. <https://doi.org/10.55271/PP0029>
- Zhao, Y., Yan, X., & Wang, L. (2021). Ballot character recognition based on image processing. *Journal of Physics: Conference Series*, 2024(1), 012010. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2024/1/012010>

